Ludwig Wittgenstein (#4, Orion)

The segment begins by showing a portrait of Wittgenstein. The narrator states, “That’s him. This picture represents him. That contains the whole problem of representation. What is the criterion? How is it to be verified that this picture is the portrait of that object, i.e. that it is meant to represent it?” It may appear to be Wittgenstein, but it’s not. It’s a portrait of him (or more precisely, a Flash recreation of a portrait of him). What we see, in other words, is not Wittgenstein himself but a representation of him. The narrator continues: “It is not similarity that makes the picture a portrait; it might be the striking resemblance of one person and yet be the portrait of someone else it resembles less.” Many people can share a similar appearance, but a portrait denoting one particular person creates context for the portrait. This is similar to paradigmatic relationships: meaning is unstable, not inherent in the entity itself, but in their relationship with other things (i.e. context); such are the limits of language.